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7Introduction
If we look to the international system and try to imagine
the manner in which the State of Palestine were to
become a full member of the community of nations, it
can readily be seen that the path that was followed in
the interim Oslo Accords was diametrically opposed to
nearly anything that preceded it. In 2000 the Palestinian
negotiating team requested that the permanent status
agreement should be a “comprehensive instrument that
spells out the details, modalities, and timetables of ending
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”. This in contrast to Oslo,
which had been “merely a document that declares general
political principles”.1 It should become evident as we
work through the legal parameters of Statehood, that
what is needed in not more legal language, but less.
In essence the Oslo Accords, although meant to be a
step towards a final settlement of the Arab/Israeli war in
Palestine, would have lead down a path of servitude for
Palestinians and may well have violated the right of self-
determination. It appears clear that the Al-Aqsa Intifada
was a visceral reaction to this realization, that while Oslo
provided for a bit of breathing space, it was leading
towards an institutionalization of a Bantu-like existence.
The purpose here is to consider the parameters of the
terms “sovereignty” and the “State” in international law.
On this basis, I shall sketch out what a Palestinian State
1
 See “Palestinian Negotiation Team: Remarks and Questions Regarding
the Clinton Plan (January 2, 2001)”, in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin
(eds.), The Israel-Arab Reader, 2001, pp. 567-573.
8should look like; and to demonstrate the need for the
arrogant mentality of sovereignty which should form part
of any Palestinian State. This mentality is the primary
tool of the statesman, who understands that, as the leader
of a sovereign State, he answers to nobody.
1. What is Sovereignty in International Law?
The historical starting point with regard to the
sovereignty of States is found in the settlement of
Westphalia of 1648 which put an end to the Thirty
Years’ War in Europe.2 A fundamental restructuring of
the system of interaction amongst people was
introduced whereby the Pope and the Holy Roman
Emperor were permanently sidelined by the fostering
of an ‘international’ system predicated on the sovereign
equality of States. The former, as spiritual head of
Western Europe, and the latter, as the ‘king of kings’,
had laid claim to ultimate supremacy in case of
religious or political disagreements among the
monarchies and principalities (and had also fought each
other for centuries over the question of political
precedence in what was known as ‘the Investiture
controversy’).
The most succinct description of the notion of
sovereignty, I believe, - and here I am speaking of
territorial sovereignty - is found in the classic
pronouncement of Max Huber in the 1928 Island of
2
 Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France
and their respective Allies (Treaty of Westphalia), Münster, 24 October 1648.
9Palmas case.3 In his Award delivered under the auspices
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the famous Swiss
jurist noted:
“Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of
the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion
of any other State, the function of a State. The
development of the national organization of States during
the last few centuries and, as a corollary, the development
of international law, have established this principles of
the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its
own territory in such a way as to make it the point of
departure in settling most questions that concern
international relations.”4
Thus, sovereignty is equated to independence:
independence in a State’s actions within its own boundaries
and independence outside those boundaries. Independence
in the sense that States answer to nobody - that there is no
higher authority than the State. Westphalia then replaced
or secularized the system of governance by displacing the
Catholic representative of God. But it also paved the road
for a further advance, in which neither Kings and Queens
were to be sovereign; instead sovereignty was to be
manifest in the arrangement of people along territorial lines.
3
 United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, 1948,
pp. 827-871. This case revolved around a case settled in favor of the
Netherlands in its dispute with the United States of America regarding
their different claims of sovereignty over this island located in the Pacific
Ocean between the Philippines and Indonesia.
4
 Op.cit., p. 838.
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Thus the international system as it exists today is
manifest in just under 200 sovereign States, which - at
least in theory - answer to nobody. I say in theory, because
States do in fact answer to each other, but only as a result
of consent. Thus any limitation of sovereignty is by
consent of that State, and thus limitations if
institutionalized are what is know as international law.
In other words, the only limits which States have to their
actions are those limits of international law to which
they have agreed.
This is completely alien to the system of law which exists
within a State as between people. As I arrived from
Egypt, I did not consent to be bound by the laws of the
State of Israel; nor as I crossed over to the West Bank, I
did not consent to the Israeli laws of occupation. No,
within a State, these are laws of compulsion. By virtue
of being within a certain geographic space I am
compelled to follow, as compulsory, the laws in force.
As the State is a centralized entity which has a monopoly
on the use of force, it can compel and coerce, through
policing and through its legal and penal systems,
individuals into following the law.
I can not pick and choose which laws I will be bound by
and which I will opt out of - it is in the Western discourse
manifest in Rousseau’s Social Contract - that individuals
give up part of their liberty and are restricted by laws in
exchange for the protection afforded them by the State.
This is diametrically opposed to the system of
international relations - an anarchical system in the true
sense of the word - one with no central authority with the
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power to compel. The result is a decentralized framework
which requires States, if they are going to be bound by
law, to agree to such a limitation of their sovereignty.5
This manifestation by States of their sovereignty allows
for the conduct of international relations through the
interaction of States based on fundamental rules as
expressed in international law. It thus becomes possible
to answer my first question: “What is sovereignty in law?”
It is the ability of a State to dictate what undertakings it
will adopt both inside its own territory, and what
obligations, if any, it will take on vis-à-vis other States.
2. What is a State in International Law?
The yardstick against which the notion of the “State” is
measured in international law finds voice in the 1933
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States. Although a regional treaty, the Montevideo
Convention sketches, in broad outlines, the customary
parameters of what is understood to be a State in
international relations. Its Article 1 reads:
“The State [in] international law should possess the
following qualifications: a permanent population; a
defined territory; government; and the capacity to enter
into relations with other States.”6
5
 Such limitations are not however, to be seen as an abandonment of
sovereignty but instead are to be considered “an attribute of State
sovereignty.” See the Wimbledon case, Permanent Court of International
Justice, 1925, Series A, Number 1, p. 25.
6
 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, League of Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 19, 1934, p. 165.
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Of these four qualifications it shall be seen that two are
objective and two subjective, and that they are
nonetheless, in their essence, interconnected. The notion
of a permanent population for instance disqualifies
Antarctica from Statehood. Thus, although no lower or
upper limit is set to the amount of population, objectively
we must be able to say that, yes, in this particular area
there is a permanent population. In the case of Palestine,
it is clear that there is a permanent population.
As for the matter of a defined territory, it is often stated
that Israel lacks the attributes of a State as it is unwilling
to define its borders. This is simply a myth and is inaccurate
from the perspective of international law on more than
one level. First, under the treaties of peace between Jordan
and Egypt with Israel, both these international borders have
been established and demarcated in law.7 Second, most
international borders are not established in fact. Whereas
they may have been agreed to on paper, perhaps 70% of
State borders worldwide remain to be demarcated. What
is needed in international law for a particular State to be
called into existence is a defined territory in the sense of a
hard core - the edges are not that relevant - by which it
may demonstrate that it has effective control. In the case
of Palestine, it is clear that there is a defined territory.8
7
 See Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace Between The Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan An The State of Israel October 26, 1994; and Article 2 of Treaty of
Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, 26 March,
1979. Note that the establishment of the Egyptian-Israeli border was settled
on the basis of the “Taba” Award by the Egyptian-Israel Arbitration Tribunal,
28 September 1988.
8
 The hard core being the West Bank and Gaza.
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It is when we leave the objective elements of statehood
and move on to the vagaries of the subjective elements
that Palestinian Statehood breaks down. Let me flip the
order of the last two qualifications and start with d) the
notion of the capacity to enter into relations with States
before considering c) the need for a government. This
ability to enter into relations with States should be
understood as the concept of “recognition.” In international
relations, before an entity can take up its seat in the
international community it must be accepted into the club
of States. The recognition by a particular pre-existing State
of the new one is its willingness to accept a newly
established State as being sovereign over a part of the globe.
While recognition may be a qualification attributed on
legal grounds, it is clear that, in the words of Hersch
Lauterpacht, “there is probably no other subject in the
field of international relations in which law and politics
appear to be more closely interwoven.”9 Thus, States
recognize other States more often than not for political
reasons, and not on the basis of their having fulfilled the
other qualifications of Statehood as noted in the
Montevideo Convention. Thus for instance, Turkey’s
willingness unilaterally to recognize Northern Cyprus
or apartheid South Africa’s to recognize its Bantustans
did not translate into these entitles becoming States from
the perspective of international law. Although the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus or, previously, Zululand,
had what amounted to a permanent population, a defined
9
 Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 1947, p. v.
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territory, issues of “government,” recognition from the
international community was not forthcoming.
To emphasize the subjective nature of recognition, which
“is given in a number of cases for purely political
reasons”10 let me simply point to the case of Israel in
1948. In that instance, issues of a definite territory and a
permanent population were tenuous at best, and the notion
of a “government” had not yet been established. However,
within hours of the Proclamation of the establishment of
the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, the United States of
America recognized the Provisional Government as the
de facto authority of the State of Israel, followed, two
days later, by de jure recognition of the State of Israel by
the Soviet Union, and thereafter recognition by a majority
of member States of the United Nations.
Where Palestine is concerned, despite the 1 October 1948
Proclamation of Independence of Palestine by the Arab
Higher Committee and the relatively recent 1988
Declaration of the Independence of the Palestinian State
proclaimed by the Palestine National Council in Algiers,11
statehood has not transpired. In the case of the 15
November 1988 Declaration, although 20 States
recognized the Palestinian State within 24 hours, and more
followed, the Palestinian State has not come into existence.
The Palestinian State has been recognized by a
significant number of States. Yet, Palestinian statehood
10
 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 1997, p. 297.
11
 Declaration of the Independence of the Palestinian State, German
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 31, 1998, pp. 681-683.
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remains elusive because it lacks one essential ingredient:
effective control over its territory and people. In other
words, it lacks one of those elements of government
which are mentioned in the Montevideo Convention. In
closing the circle on what is to be considered a State,
international law requires that such an entity be able to
assert its sovereignty by demonstrating that it can act
independently of interlopers. Without the ability to
maintain effective control no would-be State can expect
to join the club of sovereign States. Let me then, once
more, take the case of Israel: it is clear that had Israel
not been able to repel the intervention of 1948, its status
as a State would have receded, becoming little more than
an historical footnote. However, Israel’s ability to sustain
its existence in the face of invading neighboring Arab
States in 1948 and to consolidate its power through its
effective control of areas in Palestine allowed it to seize
the opportunity granted by the recognition of various
States and to emerge as a viable State.
It now becomes possible to answer the present question:
what is a State in international law? A State is an entity
recognized by the community of States as having the
independence to demonstrate its ability of effective
control over a certain territory and people.
3. What Should Sovereignty Mean for Palestine?
The first two questions I have sought to answer so far
are the two dynamics which will form the parameters
of the eventuality of Palestinian sovereignty. We have
witnessed since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada that
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the Palestinian Authority has lacked effective control
over Zones ‘A’, in which it is presumed to exercise full
administrative and security functions. It has been shown
on the ground that the breathing space provided by the
Oslo Accords in the Occupied Territories can be
reclaimed by Israel at anytime by virtue of the actions
of IDF helicopter gunships and tanks. Thus, the
emergence of a sovereign Palestine will require, not
security for Israel but security from Israel - that is some
type of assurance of Palestinian security.
What should a sovereignty mean for Palestine?
Sovereignty does not mean that Palestine will not be
bound by already established dictates of international
law. Like the newly independent States of African and
Asia which rid themselves of the yoke of colonialism
of during the 1960s and 1970s, Palestine will be bound
by the norms of customary international law - those
elements which have been such a fabric of international
relations that all are bound by its dictates. Thus, for
instance, it will have to respect fundamental norms of
human rights protection and humanitarian law.
Likewise, established rules in such fields as diplomatic
relations and the norms by which treaties are
established will automatically become part of the
restraints on statehood long established by the
community of States.
Sovereignty will mean respecting what amounts to the
obligations of the constitution of the international
system: the Charter of the United Nations. Recourse to
the peaceful settlement of disputes and the prohibitions
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on the use of force will be central to the obligations of
the State of Palestine. But also imbedded in the UN
Charter is Article 51 which provides a State with the
inherent right of the use force in self-defense. And
beyond this, the Charter recognized the possibility of
collective self-defense, of other States acting in concert
with Palestine through an alliance to protect it from
Israeli incursions. This is the true test of the
establishment of a Palestinian State and something
which should not be legislated away. Sovereignty need
not entail security guarantees for Israel, but if it does,
such considerations should be based on reciprocity.
Such guarantees should flow both ways.
I say that such guarantees need not be provided,
because beyond customary international law, which
would be automatically binding on a sovereign
Palestinian State, representatives of the Palestinian
people may undertake, or abstain from undertaking,
any further obligations. It would be within the
Palestinian State’s sovereign prerogative - an attribute
of sovereignty - to undertake to abide by specific
obligations under international law.
The establishment of a sovereign Palestinian State, as
is true of the sovereignty of all other States, should not
be conditional - it is axiomatic that it be total. That is,
any Israeli-Palestinian agreement which failed to
provide for a full measure of Palestinian self-
determination would not only fail the test of having
established a sovereign Palestinian State but would be
automatically invalid. This is so because 1969 Vienna
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Convention on the Law of Treaties considers any
international treaty to be invalid which conflicts with
a norm of jus cogens, such as that possessed by
Palestinians of a right of self-determination.12
If Palestinian authorities enter into a peace agreement
with Israel, it should be in accordance with the will of
its people and in order to ensure the viability of a strong
Palestinian State. The emergence of a sovereign
Palestinian State would thus mean that it would be free
to control its natural resources, free in conducting its
foreign policy, and free of any foreign occupation or
interference. Thus as opposed to the Interim Accords,
what sovereignty for Palestine should mean vis-à-vis
Israel, is a limited treaty which deals with a relationship
between two States, reciprocal in nature, and one that in
no way, either territorially or in terms of resources,
reflects the years of Israeli occupation. Such an
agreement should - because of the power imbalance - be
guaranteed internationally and be subject to obligatory
pacific dispute settlement.
12
 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969,
reads:
“Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law
(jus cogens):
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character”.
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4. What of the Arrogant Mentality of
Sovereignty?
I mentioned in my introduction the need to develop the
arrogant mentality of sovereignty. By this I mean, that if
one considers the role of Statesmen, it becomes obvious
that sovereignty means answering to nobody - at least
internationally. While there is a need for legitimacy
within the State - the creation of the State in international
relations provides legitimacy for the Statesmen ipso facto
(by that fact alone). The conceptual equality of States
means that no State need answer to another, no State is
to be forced to do what it does not have an obligation to
do under international law. Thus, the less the Palestinians
put on paper - as international law is the only valid
limitation in international relations - the more room will
they have to maneuver. The balance must be struck, at
least early on, between ensuring the survival of the
Palestinian State, and not tying its hands indefinably to
requirements which obstruct its evolution towards being
a truly sovereign and independent member of the club
of States. Thus the arrogance of sovereignty means that
decisions about a future Palestinian State should be made
by Palestinians and anything which does not fit that




‘Terrorism’ in International Law




The so-called ‘War on Terrorism’ currently being waged
actively by United States and supported with
unprecedented near unanimity is a misnomer. The war
currently underway - which clearly has major
ramification regarding Palestinian statehood - is not
against ‘terrorism’; instead I would suggest that it be
considered as an attempt, by States, to reclaim their
monopoly on the use of force. Not since the 1848
Revolutions in various European States have we
witnessed such a fundamental challenge to the
Westphalian system which has as its central tenet the
‘State’. And in much the same manner as States reacted
in 1848, today, more than 150 years later we are seeing
to what lengths States are willing to go to maintain their
monopoly on the use of violence.
We are witnessing a rare consensus in international
relations whereby such ideologically varying States as
China, Iran, Libya, Russia, are all actively agreed on the
need to “fight terrorism.” Why is this?  Again, I would
offer this assessment: because there is no interest on the
part of States in allowing their territory to be used by
armed opposition groups. Thus by labeling them
‘terrorist’, States can undertake an unrepentant war
against their opponents.
Further, when we consider the current situation in
Palestine and its worldwide repercussions, I believe that
we are witnessing the concrete effects of the passing of
the era in which self-determination enjoyed the active
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support of a significant portion of the community of
States. For this reason alone, there is a need for
Palestinians to retool their struggle against Israeli
occupation so that it is conducted in the occupied
territories and exclusively against the IDF. In other
words, the clear perception must be that the struggle
transpires within the norms of international law, thus
providing a breathing space for world public opinion.
1. Who is a ‘Terrorist’ in International Law?
‘Terrorism’ at its core is the use of violence against
civilians for political ends. If we adopt this as our working
definition, then it becomes clear that States like
individuals can engage in ‘terrorism’. From the innocent
victim’s perspective, whether the act is perpetrated by a
lone bomber or by the pilot of an Apache attack helicopter
matters little. Yet, as we live in a decentralized Statist
system, where international law is established through
the consent of States, it should come as little surprise
that there has been an inability to set down on paper an
agreed definition of terrorism - and by extension to define
a person who perpetrates such deeds: a ‘terrorist’.
This is inevitable, when States are prepared to fight
‘terrorism’, but unwilling to define away their right to
visit such terror upon their enemies. As a result, no over-
arching established definition of ‘terrorism’ exists in
international law. It is a term of art which is used, more
often than not, for political ends, to define the actions of
one’s enemies.
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Having said that, it is possible to discuss  the contours
of what has been agreed to in international law. Primarily,
a certain level of consensus has emerged through the
auspices of various regional inter-governmental
organizations which have negotiated treaties related to
the suppression of terrorism. Yet even here, where there
exists a consensus to legislate regarding terrorism, there
has been an inability to agree on what the term means.
In a number of cases, the notion of terrorism has been
considered to ensure that people committing specific acts
are not granted refugee status. Thus, within the context
of the Organization of American States, acts of
“terrorism” such as “kidnapping, murder, and other
assaults” against diplomats are to be considered a
common crime and thus exclude the perpetrators from
gaining refugee status.13
Likewise, for the Council of Europe and the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC14), the
13
 The various regional treaties regarding terrorism include: the 1977
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism; the Organization of
American States’ 1971 Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are
of International Significance; the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation’s 1987 Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism; the
League of Arab States’ 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism; the 1999 Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism; the 1999
Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating
International Terrorism; and the Organization of African Unity’s 1999
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.
14
 SAARC consists of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan,
and Sir Lanka.
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suppression of terrorism is meant to ensure that certain
crimes are not labeled “political” thus paving the way to
make sure that those who commit such acts are excluded
for the privilege of asylum. While SAARC does provide
for a residual definition of terrorism,15 both it and the
Council of Europe rely primarily on offenses that appear
in United Nations treaties of international criminal law.
Both point to the 1970 Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and the 1971
Montréal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation as they relate
to highjacking.16
Since the early 1970s, the United Nations has developed
a number of further conventions which establish crimes
which may well, depending on the circumstances,
constitute acts of ‘terrorism’. They include the 1979 UN
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages;
the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation;
15
 See Article 1(e), Regional Cooperation Regional Convention on
Suppression of Terrorism, South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation, Katmandu, 4 November 1987, which describes terrorism as
including: “murder, manslaughter, assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping,
hostage-taking, and offenses relating to firearms, weapons, explosives and
dangerous substances when used as a means to perpetrate indiscriminate
violence involving death or serious injury to persons or serious damage to
property.”
16
 The Council of Europe, however, did not go further in mentioning
other UN conventions related to international crimes, due to the fact that
at the time of signing the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism, European States had en bloc only ratified these two
instruments.
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and the 1997 UN Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings.17
Thus, from the perspective of these regional arrangements,
there has been an unwillingness to legislate what
‘terrorism’ is, instead they have left it to their legal systems
and their judges to make a determination whether, in the
17
 The United Nations has posted the following as universal treaties which it
considers as being related to terrorism (see untreaty.un.org/English/
Terrorism.asp):
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at
the Hague on 16 December 1970.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed at Vienna
on 3 March 1980.
Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
InternationCivil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at
Montreal on 24 February 1988.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection,
signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999.
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case at hand, an individual is guilty of a specific
international crime, which would thus preclude the
possibility for receiving asylum, and allow for extradition
of the individual to face prosecution.
Where we do find, to my knowledge, the most elaborate
definition of ‘terrorism’ in an international instrument
is within the 1999 Convention of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference on Combating International
Terrorism which states clearly:
“ ‘Terrorism’ means any act of violence or threat thereof
notwithstanding its motives or intervention perpetrated
to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with
the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them
or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or
rights or exposing the environment or any facility or
public or private property to hazards or occupying or
seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or
international facilities, or threatening the stability,
territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of
independent States.”18
And here we run into the hazard which I mentioned
earlier. Could not, for instance the quelling of the uprising
in Hama, Syria in 1981-82, or the suppression of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1990s, by the
standards of this definition, be considered terrorism?  If
I were to go further, would not simply the nature of State
18
 Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating
International Terrorism, Organization of the Islamic Conference,
Ouagadougou, 1 July 1999.
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apparatuses of many authoritarian States in the Middle
East render them ipso facto ‘terrorist’ States?
2. The Response of the United Nations
Short of international law, there appears to be a near
consensus within the UN General Assembly as to what
terrorism constitutes. Bearing in mind that General
Assembly Resolutions have limited legal worth - they
are recommendations - States have agreed in the 1995
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism,19 on the following proposition:
“Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state
of terror in the general public, a group of persons or
particular persons for political purposes are in any
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or any other nature that may be invoked to
justify them...”
More interesting, the General Assembly has resolved that
terrorism includes State terrorism. However, those
interested should be cautioned by the fact that the term
‘terrorism’ is modified by the adjective ‘international’.
Thus for the States represented at the UN General
Assembly ‘terrorism’ is meant to be criminal acts fostered
at home but perpetrated abroad. In other words, the
Member States of the General Assembly do not consider
19
 See Annex to UN General Assembly Resolution 60, Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, A/RES/49/60, 17 February 1995.
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that a State can terrorize its own people. Consider the
wording of the Declaration, wherein its preamble reads:
“Firmly determined to eliminate international terrorism
in all its forms and manifestations;
Convinced also that the suppression of acts of
international terrorism, including those in which States
are or indirectly involved, is an essential element for the
maintenance of international peace and security...”
The Declaration goes on to say in the body that:
“States, guided by the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant
rules of international law, must refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in
terrorist acts in territories of other States, or from
acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their
territories directed towards the commission of such
acts; [...]”
Yet, when we get closer to the center of power, moving
from the UN General Assembly to the Security Council,
we see that, while States may still be involved in
terrorism, the notion of ‘terrorism’ is voided of all its
content, and no definition is established.20 In the same
20
 UN Security Council Resolution 1189 stresses “that every Member State
has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating
is terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts”, S/RES/1189/
1998, 13 August 1999. This provision is reaffirmed in the wake of the
attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States by Security Council
Resolution 1373, S/RES/1373/2001, 28 September 2001.
31
manner as US Supreme Court Justice Brennan dealt with
pornography,21 so has the UN Security Council taken
the same tack regarding ‘terrorism’: that is “they know
it when they see it”.
In 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
126922 which expressed its deep concern in the face of
the increase in acts of international terrorism, and, though
making reference to the 1995 Declaration, it left wide
open what it will consider to be ‘terrorism’. Thus the
Security Council doesn’t explain what ‘terrorism’ is, it
simply
unequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices
of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of
their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations,
wherever and by whomever committed, in particular
those which could threaten international peace and
security.
Within 24 hours of the attacks of 11 September 2001 in
the United States, the Security Council condemned these
acts, regarding them as a threat to international peace
and security, and opening the gate to Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter which allows for the use of force
in an attempt to re-establish peace and security. A month
later, the Security Council went further, declaring that
“acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most
21
 See Miller v. California, Supreme Court of the United States, 413 U.S.
15, 1973.
22
 UN Security Council Resolution 1269, S/RES/1269/1999, 19 October
1999.
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serious threats to international peace and security in the
twenty-fist century” and labeling international terrorism
as a “scourge” - that is to say, a pestilence or a plague.23
The lack of a clear definition of what ‘terrorism’ is - and
thus the manner by which, in law, one is to distinguish
between a ‘terrorist’ and a ‘freedom fighter’ - means that
we must look elsewhere in an attempt to disassociate
the ‘terrorist’ from the ‘freedom fighter’.
3. Who is a ‘Freedom Fighter’ in
    International Law?
Like ‘terrorism’, the notion of ‘freedom fighting’ is not
defined in international law. However, there are quite
specific situations in which individuals may take up arms
- legally - in an attempt to gain control over territory.
This possibility exists within the overarching basis of
international relations: attempts by States to coexist. In
no uncertain terms it may be said that the totality of the
infrastructures of international relations exist because
States have found the expense of the advancements in
the art of war too costly. Up to the 19th Century, war
was a ‘gentlemen’s sport’, but the First World War made
it clear that war could cost one, not only a State - but an
empire. The Great War was responsible for the collapse
of Czarist Russia, for the end of the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires. If the price of war were to mean
that you would end up with modern day Austria, then
the price was too high.
23
 UN Security Council Resolution 1377, S/RES/1377/2001, 12 November 2001.
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Thus developed the twin pillars of international relations
during the 20th Century - the peaceful settlement of
disputes and the restrictions on the use of force.24 While
the Permanent Court of International Justice and its
successor, the International Court of Justice would come
to be marginalized, limitations on the use of force would
grow more restrictive. The first formalized structure to
limit the use of force was established by the League of
Nations, which sought, not to outlaw war but to delay it.
Seeking to fight the last war, the League set up a system
which provided a cooling off period of three months, the
lack of which was then seen as a major reason for the
precipitation into the First World War. Despite this
limitation by the community of nations and the 1928
Briand-Kellogg Pact, which outlawed war as an instrument
of national policy, neither of these attempts could stall the
momentum towards the Second World War.
Seeking to rectify the failures of the past, the Charter of
the United Nations was established in 1945 and sought,
not only to remove from the purview of the State the ability
to go to war but to outlaw any use of force.25 Instead, the
legitimate use of force was to be internationalized, to be
handed over to the Untied Nations Security Council which
was to act on behalf of the international community. While
States did not disavow their “inherent right” of self-
defense,26 such use of force was to be contemplated only
24
 See Jean Allain, A Century of International Adjudication: The Rule of
Law and its Limits, 2000.
25
 See Article 2(4), Charter of the Untied Nations.
26
 See Article 51, Id.
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“until the Security Council has taken measure necessary
to maintain international peace and security.”27 Beyond
acting in self-defense, States forfeited any unilateral
determination to the use of force. Where the use of force
could be projected, it was to be undertaken in concert,
under the collective security arrangements found in
Chapter VII of the Charter. Within the dictates of Chapter
VII, where the Security Council determined that, by virtue
of Article 39, there existed a threat or a breach of the
peace or an act of aggression, it is empowered to take
measures including “such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security”.
These are, thus, the parameters in which States can use
force legally in international relations. Within these
limitations is there a place for ‘freedom fighters’?  The
answer is yes, and it finds itself within the evolution of
the concept of the ‘right to self-determination’ which
was first pronounced by United States President
Woodrow Wilson as the American basis for the
settlement of the First World War. While the Wilsonian
conception of ‘self-determination’ was at the heart of
the new international order created at Paris in 1919 and
was formalized, as a legal principle, within the Covenant
of the League of Nations, it lacked a clear formulation;
and, as a result, fell victim to the vagaries of political
machinations. It was only in the aftermath of the Second
World War that the concept would become firmly
imbedded in international relations as the “intellectual
27
 See Article 42, Id.
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engine of decolonization.” With the growing number of
newly independent States came the call for the
establishment of self-determination as a legal right.
Yet, that right was to be defined in the narrowest of terms to
ensure that the statist system did not disintegrate; thus States
“remain silent in response to claims asserting the right
of self-determination [...] on behalf of ethnic groups,
such as the Kurds, Armenians, and Basque; indigenous
populations, such as the native peoples of Latin
America, North America, Australia, and New Zealand;
linguistic minorities, such as the Québecois; and
religious groups such as the Catholics in Northern
Ireland.”28
While self-determination was lifted by the Charter of the
United Nations from political rhetoric to a principle of
international relations, it would finally gain true legal
standing internationally through State practice as
fundamental changes to the international system emerged
in the 1960s and 1970s. The East-West chasm which
developed in the guise of the Cold War allowed breathing
space for former colonized States to agitated for
independence using the notion of self-determination as
found in Article 1(2) of the Charter as their guiding
principle.29
28
 Paul Szasz, “The Irresistible Force of Self-Determination Meets the
Impregnable Fortress of Territorial Integrity:  A Cautionary Fairy Tale about
Clashes in Kosovo and Elsewhere”, Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law, Vol. 28, 1999, p. 3.
29
 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, 1995,
103.
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In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly passed
Resolution 1514, the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
wherein it proclaimed that “all peoples have the right to
self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.”30 The
affirmation of this Declaration in the General Assembly,
coupled with the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations,
amounted to an opinio juris which, backed with the
practice of States, establishes a customary right of self-
determination. The 1970 Declaration went a step further
in noting that States have a duty not to deprive people
who are subject to “colonialism” and “alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation” of their right to self-
determination.31
Thus emerged from the United Nations a legal right to
self-determination, however, it was limited to very
specific situations. The right of self-determination was
to be conceived as that for all people to assert their right
only in the three following situations: against colonial
regimes, racist/apartheid regimes, or military occupying
forces.32
30
 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, 14 December
1960.
31
 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625,
24 October 1970.
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Along with this clearly determined right to self-
determination, States have, for the most part, further
recognized the right to struggle against colonial or racist
regimes and foreign occupation. Thus, there was a slow
assimilation of the fight for freedom, as against these three
modes of alien occupation, with the notion of ‘the inherent
right of self-defense’ as established in Article 51 of the UN
Charter. In the conclusions of her 1990 study, International
Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation
Movements, Heather Wilson notes, however, that there is a
fly in the ointment:
“The authority of national liberation movements to use
force is not agreed upon as a matter of international law.
Such authority is actively supported by the newly
independent States and the Eastern Bloc States, but has
never been accepted by an established government
confronting a liberation movement, or by Western States.
........
1966 human rights Covenants related to civil and political rights, and
economic, social and cultural rights have a common Article 1 which reads:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising
out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle
of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be
deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
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Practice in the UN, particularity the Declaration on
Principles of International Law and the Declaration on
Aggression, both adopted without a vote, does not
resolve the fundamental differences of opinion over the
status of national liberation movements and the extent
of their authority as a matter of law. However, the trend
over the last four decades and since 1960 in particular
has been toward the extension of the authority to use force
to national liberation movements.”33
4. On Applying Force in the Palestinian
Liberation Struggle
As the right to use force in a struggle for self-
determination is not clearly established in law, it is
essential, from my perspective, that Palestinians retool
their efforts to rid themselves of Israeli occupation so as
to ensure that the era of self-determination does not pass
them by. We may be in the midst of seeing the end of the
era of self-determination as most situations which fit the
quite limited definition established by the community
of States - against colonial or racist regimes, or
occupation - no longer exist. States may be inclined to
decide amongst themselves to put an end to this right to
the detriment of the Palestinian cause. As a result, it
would appear to me that what is needed is to ensure that
the Palestinian struggle clearly show itself to the
international community of States and to international
33
 Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National
Liberation Movements, 1990, p. 136. Emphasis added.
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public opinion as a liberation movement, one that abides
by the dictates of the laws of war - which means targeting
IDF fighters in the Occupied Territories.
As an occupation has been assimilated to the notion of an
act of aggression, a permanent state of war exists until the
occupier has been ejected. As such the laws of war - the
Geneva Conventions - hold in the territories. Like it or
not, this means that while the transfer of Israeli population
into the territories is illegal, this is an act which implicates
the State of Israel, not the individuals concerned. Instead,
the Israeli settlers are civilians, protected, like Palestinian
civilians, by the fourth Geneva Convention. However,
much in the same way that Hizbullah primarily targeted
the IDF, ultimately forcing them to quit Southern Lebanon,
the IDF in the Occupied Territories, including annexed
East Jerusalem, are fare game.
From the analysis of the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘freedom
fighting’, what emerges is a clear distinction. Ultimately,
international law is on the side of the Palestinians, it
may be the only advantage they have in their isolation
by the community of nations, both within the Arab world
and further afield. There is in law a right to struggle
against foreign occupation and to self-determination. The
struggle appears to extend to the right to use force.
However, the door of self-determination may be closed
if Palestinians, as one of the few, if not the only remaining
group to benefit from such a right, abuse it.
The need to distance the struggle from acts which could
be construed as being of a ‘terrorist’ nature is, again, in
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my opinion, essential. Such acts weaken both the nature
of that struggle as one of ‘national liberation’ and fail in
the arena of public opinion.
By targeting the IDF, one can clearly carry one’s head
high in a struggle against a foreign occupation. The use
of violence against civilians for political purposes, to
me appears futile to the end being sought - a sovereign
Palestinian State. I would go further by saying that it
plays into the hands of the occupiers, who can thus label
Palestinians ‘terrorists’ thus de-humanizing them; a
process which allows for the most unspeakable human
rights abuses to be perpetrated in the name of ‘security’,
or ‘rooting out evil’, or ‘civilization’. It is clear that the
playing field is not even - there is no need for the
Palestinians to lower themselves to the level of the IDF.
